Works in Progress

‘Felicitous Underspecification and Updates’, unpublished book ms.


New Thinking About Propositions.  (with Jeff Speaks and Scott Soames) New York: Oxford University Press, (2014). View

The Nature and Structure of Content. New York: Oxford University Press, (2007). View

Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA   View


‘Binding, Compositionality ands Semantic Values’, (with Michael Glanzberg), forthcoming in Philosophers’ Imprint. PDF

‘ “Descriptive Readings” of Noun Phrases’, forthcoming in Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Language, E. Lepore (ed.), Oxford University Press.   PDF

‘Unstructured Content’ forthcoming in Oxford University Press volume on unstructured content.  PDF

‘The Metaphysics of Propositions’, forthcoming in Oxford Handbooks Online, Oxford University Press.  PDF

‘Singular Thought, Russellianism, and Mental Files’ forthcoming in anthology on singular thought, James Genone, Rachel Goodman and Nick Kroll eds.  PDF

‘Speaker Intentions and Objective Metasemantics’, 2020, The Architecture of Context and Context Sensitivity, Ciecierski, Grabarczyk (Eds), Springer Nature, Switzerland, 55-80.  PDF

‘On Propositions and Fineness of Grain (Again!)’,  Synthese, 2019, 196 (4), 1343-1367.  PDF

‘Propositions and Truth Bearers’, 2018, The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford University Press.  PDF

‘W(h)ither Semantics!(?)’,  Noûs, 2018, Vol. 52 Issue 4, 772-795.  PDF

‘Strong contextual felicity and felicitous underspecification’,  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018, 97 (3), 631-657.  PDF

‘Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis’, 2016, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Cappelen, Gendler and Hawthorne eds., Oxford University Press, 249-261.  PDF

3 A.M. Interview PDF

‘Timothy Williamson on the Contingently Concrete and Non-concrete’, 2016, Analysis, 76 (2), 190-201. PDF

‘Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Singular Propositions’, Philosophical Studies (2015) Volume 172, Issue 2, 543-560. PDF

‘The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity’, (2014) in Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, A. Burgess, B. Sherman eds., Oxford University Press, New York, 97-118.  PDF

Speaker Intentions in Context’,  Noûs, (2014) 48, no. 2, 219-237  PDF

‘Supplementives, The Coordination Account and Conflicting Intentions’, 2013, Philosophical Perspectives 27 Philosophy of Language. PDF

‘Propositional Unity: What’s the Problem, Who has it and Who Solves it?’,  Philosophical Studies (2013)  165 (1), 71-93 PDF

On Fineness of Grain’,  Philosophical Studies (2013) vol 163 number 3: 763-781 PDF

Questions of Unity “, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CIX, Part 3, (2009), pp. 257-277.  PDF

“Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses and Direct Reference”, The Philosophical Review 117, (2008), pp. 99-117 . PDF

“Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies”, Philosophical Studies 141(2), (2008), pp. 209-242. PDF

“What in the world are the ways things might have been?”, Philosophical Studies 133, (2007), pp. 443-453 . PDF

“Singular Terms, Reference and Methodology in Semantics”, Philosophical Issues, supplement to Nous 16, (2006), pp. 141-161. PDF

“Semantics for Monists”, Mind 115(460), (2006), pp. 1023-1058. PDF

“Semantics, Pragmatics and the Role of Semantic Content”. In Semantics versus Pragmatics, Zóltan Gendler Szabó (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, (2005) pp. 111-164. PDF
Co-authored with Jason Stanley

“Context Dependent Quantifiers and Donkey Anaphora”. In New Essays in the Philosophy of Language, Supplement to Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 30, M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton and C. Viger (ed.), Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press, (2004) pp. 97-127. PDF

“Tense, Modality and Semantic Values”. In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 15, J. Hawthorne (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, (2003) pp. 195-245. PDF

“Syntactic Evidence for Semantic Claims”, Unpublished Ms. Reply to Johnson and Lepore (2003), RuCSS Technical Report 69, (2003), pp. 17. PDF

“Two Sorts of Claims about Logical Form”. In Logical Form and Language, G. Preyer and G. Peter (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, (2002) pp. 118-131. PDF

“Designating Propositions”, Philosophical Review 111(3), (2002), pp. 341-371. PDF

“Remarks on the Syntax and Semantics of Day Designators”. In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 15, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, (2001) pp. 291-333. PDF

“Are Complex ‘That’ Phrases Devices of Direct Reference?”, Nous 33(2), (1999), pp. 155-182. PDF

“What is a Philosophical Analysis?”, Philosophical Studies 90, (1998), pp. 155-179. PDF

“The Sources of Necessity”, Protosociology 10, (1997), pp. 86-109.

“Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(5), (1996), pp. 495-521.

“Structured Propositions and Complex Predicates”, Nous 29(4), (1995), pp. 516-535. PDF

“Can Propositions be Naturalistically Acceptable?”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19, (1994), pp. 53-75.

“Anaphora and Operators”, Nous Supplement Philosophical Issues, vol.8, (1994), pp. 221-250. PDF

“Intentional Identity Generalized”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 22(1), (1993), pp. 61-93.

“Instantial Terms, Anaphora and Arbitrary Objects”, Philosophical Studies 61(3), (1991), pp. 239-266. PDF

“Are Indefinite Descriptions Ambiguous?”, Philosophical Studies 53(3), (1988), pp. 417-440. PDF

“Pronouns, Descriptions and the Semantics of Discourse”, Philosophical Studies 51(3), (1987), pp. 341-363. PDF